Review history for Gebal × OpenAI; each dated run records its source-specific coverage and limits.
gebal-openai.md
Loading report…
Original review plus 2 dated follow-up sections, with findings, accepted risks, fixes, deferred work and coverage limits in this file.
Initial review: GlazeCorp reviewed using OpenAI gpt-daybreak-blue-latest at ultra reasoning effort with Gebal (pinned at 9ad24645f92a3821ae4539db5f1be52b48ed379e).
Reproducible review evidence. A review workbench that tracks source scope, model runs and sandboxed checks. Coverage and evidence limits are recorded alongside its observations.
Requested program: Daybreak Blue. Recorded model ID: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Model selection was recorded locally; the CLI did not independently echo server-side identity.
This file includes 2 dated follow-up sections. Each records its own models, settings, source revision, outcome and project responses.
Initial reviewed revision: e140b6724247425d2fa506d9bb31832d54be71c7Initial reviewed source. Each dated follow-up section records its own source revision, actual coverage, model identity and settings; later fixes are identified separately.
Review history for Gebal × OpenAI; each dated run records its source-specific coverage and limits.
gebal-openai.md
Original review plus 2 dated follow-up sections, with findings, accepted risks, fixes, deferred work and coverage limits in this file.
Initial review: GlazeCorp reviewed using OpenAI gpt-daybreak-blue-latest at ultra reasoning effort with Gebal (pinned at 9ad24645f92a3821ae4539db5f1be52b48ed379e).
Reproducible review evidence. A review workbench that tracks source scope, model runs and sandboxed checks. Coverage and evidence limits are recorded alongside its observations.
Requested program: Daybreak Blue. Recorded model ID: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Model selection was recorded locally; the CLI did not independently echo server-side identity.
This file includes 2 dated follow-up sections. Each records its own models, settings, source revision, outcome and project responses.
Initial reviewed revision: e140b6724247425d2fa506d9bb31832d54be71c7Initial reviewed source. Each dated follow-up section records its own source revision, actual coverage, model identity and settings; later fixes are identified separately.
Findings and responses
Project responses updated October 9, 2026. Latest inventory: 133 observations including duplicates; 125 accepted, two locally remediated Periphery observations, six deferred in whole or part, zero undecided contract portions. The Periphery fix passed 43 contract and 21 SDK tests; the owner waived its additional independent re-audit, which was not run. Acceptance is not remediation; deferred work stays open.
Project responses updated October 5, 2026. Original reviewer labels are preserved. Accepted risks are not fixes; local verification is separate from independent re-audit. Findings refer to the source revision on this report, not every later contract change.
This index includes reported findings, leads and rejected observations from the recorded passes. Repeated or overlapping entries are retained with their source IDs; they must not be counted as separate confirmed vulnerabilities.
C-01 — Zero-weight intervals can permanently strand admitted stream funding
Severity: Provisional Medium.
Original observation status: Known documented mechanisms; Resonance accepted, Bribe policy partly unresolved.
Project review: R002-FINAL-010 — Resonance routing only checks signal weight at the start.
Disposition: Accepted Resonance zero-signal behavior; no contract change.
Response: The owner chose to leave the current implementation unchanged, citing prior Veridise review and a preference to avoid further changes. Retain the existing start guard and accept the later-zero stream behavior. This disposition does not expand the historical auditor's verified scope or imply that an accepted limitation is fixed.
Remaining work / limits: Keep the difference between buffered new revenue and elapsed unallocated revenue clear in documentation. Preserve the existing guard, accrued entitlements and stream accounting during unrelated later work. Original evidence, severity disagreements and historical audit scope remain preserved. No code change, new execution, deployment verification or freeze closure is claimed.
Project review: R002-FINAL-008 — Direct Bribe routing can start a stream with no signal weight.
Disposition: Accepted zero-weight Bribe funding risk; no contract change.
Response: The owner conditionally accepted this finding if Curve MultiRewards retains the same zero-stake behavior, preferring minimal deviation from the upstream accounting. A read-only comparison confirms that condition. This is project risk acceptance, not a fix or an upstream security endorsement.
Remaining work / limits: Keep the loss of elapsed unallocated rewards and permissionless-admission difference explicit in reward documentation. Preserve the upstream comparison, original audit observations and evidence limits. No contract changes, tests, deployed-behavior verification, broader safety conclusion, or freeze closure are claimed.
Project review: R002-FINAL-009 — A Bribe stream can lose its final signal after a valid start.
Disposition: Accepted later-zero Bribe stream risk; no contract change.
Response: The owner explicitly accepted this finding after reviewing that Curve MultiRewards retains the same empty-period accounting. Preserve the inherited accounting for simplicity; this records an accepted limitation, not a fix or upstream endorsement.
Remaining work / limits: Keep the empty-interval loss and preserved previously earned claims clear in reward documentation. Preserve original source observations, upstream-comparison evidence and execution limits. No contract change, new test, live verification or source-freeze closure is claimed.
C-02 — Auction can complete a fill to itself without reducing inventory
Severity: Provisional Low-Medium; import Low.
Original observation status: Exact prior overlap; source corroboration only.
Project review: R002-FINAL-021 — Core Auction can advance its epoch with inventory still in custody.
Disposition: Accepted core Auction self-recipient behavior; no contract change.
Response: The owner declined the recommended self-recipient validation and accepted that the core Auction may record a completed purchase and restart pricing while inventory remains in its custody under standard self-transfer behavior.
Remaining work / limits: Record current recipient semantics and the explicit decision not to add the proposed guard in the implementation reference. Preserve original auditor recommendations, conclusions and evidence limits. No contract change, new test execution, deployment verification or source-freeze closure is claimed.
C-03 — Self-beneficiary settlement can clear liabilities without an asset outflow
Severity: Provisional Low.
Original observation status: Conditional source hypothesis; split Mine and FullRange for triage; do not merge with Mine stranded emissions.
Project review: R002-FINAL-048 — Mine self-beneficiaries may clear liabilities without reducing custody.
Disposition: Accepted Mine self-beneficiary configuration risk; no additional guard or contract change.
Response: The owner accepts responsibility for selecting usable beneficiaries and does not want a special-case Mine self-address restriction for this finding. The decision rests on the identified consequence being confined to the misdirected entitlement, with no protocol-wide blockage identified in the reviewed code, rather than assuming that every invalid destination can be prevented.
Remaining work / limits: No additional remediation selected for finding 048. Retain the accepted risk in main and original reports; no contract, UI, test or deployment change and no new dynamic validation is claimed.
Project review: R002-FINAL-049 — FullRange self-beneficiaries may clear liabilities without reducing custody.
Disposition: Accepted FullRange self-beneficiary configuration risk; no additional recipient guard.
Response: Consistent with finding 048, the owner accepts responsibility for selecting usable fee recipients and declines a special self-address restriction. The source report identifies possible stranded fees for a misconfigured recipient, without establishing third-party theft or protocol-wide blockage.
Remaining work / limits: Reassess this mechanism as part of implementing and verifying the agreed FullRange redesign after freeze closure, without adding a special recipient guard for this finding. No source, ABI, UI, test or deployment change, dynamic reproduction or completed remediation is claimed.
H-01 — Existing-token pairs are first-registration-wins
Severity: Unscored.
Original observation status: Known prior pair-reservation overlap; canonical fresh launch is atomic.
Project review: R002-FINAL-022 — Unfunded public pair registration can reserve a market indefinitely.
Fix: Removed FullRangeFactory. FullRange directly creates and registers independent wrappers, enumerates all wrappers per PoolId and separates pool initialization from wrapper funding. Launchpad atomically registers, seeds and hands off ownership using the wrapper address. SDK discovery and indexer entities distinguish wrapper identity from shared PoolId. The subsequent first-release simplification removes legacy v5/v6 adapters from the current client. Existing deployments retain their original on-chain behavior.
Status: Implemented; focused local verification passed; dated follow-up reviews recorded separately with coverage limits.
Local verification (recorded October 5): Native tests passed for abandoned registration, independent first funding, existing-price later funding, atomic launch rollback and ownership handoff. Runtime size is under the chain limit; final deployment and integration checks are recorded in the remediation ledger.
Independent follow-up: Source-specific reviews ran October 6 and October 8; see the dated follow-up sections in this report and the tools and supplementary reviews for actual coverage and limits. These reviews are not blanket confirmation of every historical fix or the later Periphery option.
H-02 — Permissionless asymmetric FullRange collection may repeatedly realize fractional fee loss
Severity: Unscored.
Original observation status: Initial dependency-blocked lead narrowed by full V4 supplement and accepted bound.
Project review: R002-FINAL-024 — Shared V4 position updates can discard fractional raw fees.
Disposition: Accepted native V4 fractional-fee rounding; no additional contract change.
Response: After confirming that the fee conversion and checkpoint advance occur in Uniswap V4 core, the owner accepted this inherited precision limitation. FullRange controls when it updates a position and retains its existing partial collection guard. This reconfirms prior acceptance without treating upstream behavior as a formal upstream risk endorsement.
Remaining work / limits: Retain rounding disclosures and preserve the existing partial guard when implementing findings 001 and 022. Verify per-wrapper position identity for the adapted guard in that later implementation phase. Preserve original severity and evidence records; acceptance is not a fix or proof of negligible impact for every asset. No additional contract change, new test execution, deployment verification or source-freeze closure is claimed.
H-03 — A later signal deposit reverses explicit zero-address vote delegation
Severity: Unscored.
Original observation status: Source-only documented behavior; requirement and governance consumer unresolved.
Project review: R002-FINAL-070 — A later signal deposit may reset explicit voting opt-out.
Disposition: Accepted deposit-triggered self-delegation by design; no contract change.
Response: After reviewing the distinction between Strategy signaling and governance delegation, the owner accepts the simple rule that a deposit with no delegate activates self-voting again. Persistent zero-address opt-out is not selected as a product requirement.
Remaining work / limits: Retain the delegation behavior and clear governance integration guidance. No additional contract remediation is selected; no source, UI, test or deployment change or new runtime verification is claimed.
H-04 — Permissionless Resonance checkpoints can realize documented rounding surplus more frequently
Disposition: Accepted fractional checkpoint rounding loss; no contract change.
Response: The owner accepted the existing rounding behavior after reviewing that fractions are discarded when accounting advances, more frequent updates can increase the loss, and preserving those fractions would require additional accounting. This records acceptance of the limitation, not a verified fix or a universal claim that its economic impact is negligible.
Remaining work / limits: Keep the permanent fractional-entitlement loss and denomination-dependent impact explicit in reward-accounting documentation. Preserve original auditor conclusions, severity and evidence limits. No contract change, new test execution, deployment verification or source-freeze closure is claimed.
H-05 — OperationsPeriphery does not follow a later Mine revenue-router replacement
Severity: Unscored.
Original observation status: Operational hypothesis; manual routing remains possible; may intentionally service initial graph.
Project review: R002-FINAL-071 — OperationsPeriphery may retain a replaced Mine router.
Disposition: Accepted original-graph maintenance behavior; replacement helper handled during migration.
Response: The owner agrees that a replacement maintenance helper can be deployed as part of the last-resort migration rather than changing the existing periphery to follow arbitrary revenue destinations automatically.
Remaining work / limits: When a replacement-system migration is actually undertaken, implement/configure a compatible helper as needed, verify graph identity and maintenance behavior, and update frontend/keeper wiring. No immediate remediation is selected and no source, deployment or completed migration is claimed.
H-06 — Skip-only maintenance batches erase their own Skipped events
Severity: Unscored.
Original observation status: Operational hypothesis; explicit NothingReady semantics; no custody effect.
Project review: R002-FINAL-072 — A skip-only maintenance revert removes its own diagnostic events.
Disposition: Accepted skip-only maintenance revert semantics; no contract change.
Response: The owner accepts NothingReady as the explicit no-work outcome. Rolled-back skip logs are an observability limitation, not a demonstrated custody or accounting failure.
Remaining work / limits: Retain the no-work interpretation in client/keeper integration guidance. No contract remediation is selected; no source, UI, deployment or new runtime verification is claimed.
H-07 — Immediate component ownership handoffs can cause permanent administrative lockout
Severity: Unscored.
Original observation status: Privileged operational footgun; canonical initial controller is known.
Response: The owner accepts responsibility for authorized ownership actions and wants the UI to handle those actions clearly rather than changing contract ownership mechanics.
Remaining work / limits: Implement and verify the administration UI address review, handoff-state explanations and renunciation confirmations during remediation. No contract or UI implementation, runtime validation, deployment verification or source-freeze closure is claimed here.
H-08 — Public deployers and permanent binders do not authenticate a reciprocal graph
Disposition: Accepted deployment configuration risk with existing post-deployment verification; no contract change.
Response: The owner confirmed that deployment verification scripts are used after deployment to check the resulting configuration and chose to rely on that release process.
Remaining work / limits: Keep post-deployment verification as a release requirement and retain results for the exact deployed configuration. No verifier execution, deployment, source implementation or source-freeze closure is claimed in this decision.
C-01 — Inspector false result is ignored
Severity: Import Medium.
Original observation status: Known integration warning, not active defect; no configured incompatible inspector shown.
Project review: R002-FINAL-037 — An OFT inspector must revert to reject a message.
Disposition: Accepted optional-inspector integration requirement; disabled in checked deployment.
Response: After clarifying that the inspector is optional and unnecessary for the current setup, the owner accepted leaving it disabled and retaining the standard implementation.
Remaining work / limits: No present implementation required. If future requirements introduce an inspector, verify its rejection path before configuration. Evidence: consolidation/finding-036-deployment/result.json; upstream reference: https://github.com/LayerZero-Labs/devtools/blob/main/packages/oft-evm/contracts/OFTCore.sol. No new chain read, configuration change, deployment or source-freeze closure is claimed for this disposition.
C-02 — OFT ownership handoff is one-step and does not synchronize the endpoint delegate
Severity: Import Medium.
Original observation status: Known administrative handoff risk; no observed bad current handoff.
Project review: R002-FINAL-033 — OFT ownership and endpoint delegate authority can diverge.
Disposition: Accepted LayerZero owner/delegate separation by design; no contract change.
Response: The owner chose to keep the upstream role separation by design. LayerZero documents delegate configuration separately from ownership transfer; the project accepts the operational consequences rather than adding automatic synchronization.
Remaining work / limits: Document intentional owner/delegate configurations and review both roles during operational handoffs. Official reference checked October 4: https://docs.layerzero.network/v2/get-started/create-lz-oapp/configuring-pathways (separate delegate and owner configuration). No contract or UI implementation, new executable validation, live-state verification or source-freeze closure is claimed.
C-03 — Immediate single-peer rotation can reject in-flight burned transfers
Severity: Import Medium.
Original observation status: Conditional liveness hypothesis; reversible restoration may recover; no permanent loss established.
Project review: R002-FINAL-034 — Peer replacement can disrupt messages already in flight.
Disposition: Accepted live peer-change operational risk; no contract change.
Response: After reviewing the difference between delegate changes and peer replacement, the owner chose to retain the standard implementation and exercise care when setting peers once bridging is live.
Remaining work / limits: Document live peer-change precautions and rehearse any exceptional migration against the actual endpoint and message state before execution. LayerZero retry reference: https://docs.layerzero.network/v2/developers/evm/troubleshooting/debugging-messages. No contract or UI implementation, live configuration change, recovery test or source-freeze closure is claimed.
C-04 — Empty-time decay permits newly funded buyback revenue to settle at zero payment
Severity: Import Medium; documented design.
Original observation status: Accepted but present; not newly discovered defect.
Project review: R002-FINAL-027 — An idle buyback auction can distribute revenue without retiring GLAZE.
Disposition: Accepted buyback idle decay and zero-retirement sales; no contract change.
Response: The owner accepted that the GLAZE buyback auction can distribute USDG while retiring zero GLAZE after its price fully decays. This reconfirms the previously documented economic policy and applies the same retained decay direction as finding 026 to the buyback contract.
Remaining work / limits: Keep public buyback explanations accurate about zero-retirement sales and distinguish revenue funding from actual GLAZE retirement. Preserve original ratings, historical acceptance and evidence limits. No contract change, new test execution, deployment verification or source-freeze closure is claimed.
C-05 — Splitter administration can become permanently unable to rotate a failed recipient
Severity: Import Low.
Original observation status: Separate preconditions: conditional issuer behavior versus owner finalization.
Project review: R002-FINAL-025 — Paying the old team recipient can block splitter rotation.
Fix: GlazeRevenueSplitter.setTeamRecipient now updates configuration without transferring tokens. Permissionless split sends floor(current USDG balance / 2) to each current destination and retains an odd raw unit. Removed totalToEach and historical distribution bookkeeping; preserved validation, reentrancy guard and atomic payout rollback.
Status: Implemented; focused local verification passed; dated follow-up reviews recorded separately with coverage limits.
Local verification (recorded October 5): All 57 token-contract tests passed with 1,024 fuzz iterations, including current-wallet payout, odd carry, independent recipient updates, authorization and failed-payout rollback; token workspace typecheck passed.
Independent follow-up: Source-specific reviews ran October 6 and October 8; see the dated follow-up sections in this report and the tools and supplementary reviews for actual coverage and limits. These reviews are not blanket confirmation of every historical fix or the later Periphery option.
Response: The owner states that splitter ownership will not be renounced and considers replacement deployment an additional operational option. Retained ownership preserves recipient-rotation authority; replacement deployment alone is not recovery of existing funds.
Remaining work / limits: Keep ownership retention and replacement-migration limits explicit in operations guidance. If replacement is needed, verify deployment bindings, upstream redirection permissions and treatment of old balances/claims. No additional contract remediation or completed recovery is claimed.
C-06 — The single-genesis OFT supply rule is operational, not enforced
Severity: Import Medium.
Original observation status: Known assumption with official tooling controls; not source exploit.
Project review: R002-FINAL-036 — Cross-chain supply is a deployment and peer trust invariant.
Disposition: Accepted deployment-controlled supply design; registered genesis verified with bounded live evidence.
Response: The owner accepted retaining the design and clarified that GLAZE is already deployed, requesting verification of the existing deployment rather than a new contract restriction.
Remaining work / limits: Retain consolidation/finding-036-deployment/README.md, result.json and verify.py as the verification record. Preserve supply checks and trusted-peer controls for future chain additions or migrations. No transaction was sent and the source freeze remains active.
C-07 — Exact-transfer and canonical-token assumptions are not enforced by the contracts
Severity: Import Low.
Original observation status: Manifest/token compatibility validation; deliberately unsupported tokens not unconditional bugs.
Disposition: Accepted deployment configuration risk with existing post-deployment verification; no contract change.
Response: The owner confirmed that deployment verification scripts are used after deployment to check the resulting configuration and chose to rely on that release process.
Remaining work / limits: Keep post-deployment verification as a release requirement and retain results for the exact deployed configuration. No verifier execution, deployment, source implementation or source-freeze closure is claimed in this decision.
Disposition: Accepted supported-token assumptions; production compatibility and issuer-control verification pending.
Response: The owner accepts the token assumptions and related issuer risks already reviewed, while retaining verification of the actual intended production assets rather than relying on token names or symbols.
Remaining work / limits: Verify and document production token identity, compatibility and issuer powers for intended supported assets during release/integration review. No new contract machinery is selected and no live-asset check, source change, runtime execution, deployment or completed fix is claimed here.
I-01 — One raw USDG unit can change recipient attribution during rotation
Severity: Informational.
Original observation status: Documented informational behavior.
Project review: R002-FINAL-073 — An odd raw revenue unit can cross a recipient rotation.
Disposition: Accepted odd-unit carry across recipient rotation; no additional contract change.
Response: The owner accepts bounded rounding under the equal split and reconfirms that unpaid balances use the current recipient rather than creating rights for former wallets.
Remaining work / limits: Retain the rounding policy during the previously approved splitter remediation and document it accurately. No additional change is selected for this finding and no source modification, new execution, deployment or completed fix is claimed.
H-01 — At-most-once inbound minting is entirely endpoint-dependent
Original observation status: No positive replay finding; prior separate bounded source/tests support endpoint checks.
Response: No implemented fix or owner acceptance is recorded for this observation. Its original lead/rejection status above is retained; follow-up adjudication is pending where applicable.
REV-01 — Preserve recipient rotation when the old team address cannot receive USDG
Severity: Candidate conditional Medium.
Original observation status: Known conditional overlap; no owner acceptance inferred from warning.
Project review: R002-FINAL-025 — Paying the old team recipient can block splitter rotation.
Fix: GlazeRevenueSplitter.setTeamRecipient now updates configuration without transferring tokens. Permissionless split sends floor(current USDG balance / 2) to each current destination and retains an odd raw unit. Removed totalToEach and historical distribution bookkeeping; preserved validation, reentrancy guard and atomic payout rollback.
Status: Implemented; focused local verification passed; dated follow-up reviews recorded separately with coverage limits.
Local verification (recorded October 5): All 57 token-contract tests passed with 1,024 fuzz iterations, including current-wallet payout, odd carry, independent recipient updates, authorization and failed-payout rollback; token workspace typecheck passed.
Independent follow-up: Source-specific reviews ran October 6 and October 8; see the dated follow-up sections in this report and the tools and supplementary reviews for actual coverage and limits. These reviews are not blanket confirmation of every historical fix or the later Periphery option.
OFT-01 — Enforce the single canonical genesis-mint invariant
Severity: Candidate Medium.
Original observation status: Known deployment invariant with official plan controls; not an unprivileged mint defect.
Project review: R002-FINAL-036 — Cross-chain supply is a deployment and peer trust invariant.
Disposition: Accepted deployment-controlled supply design; registered genesis verified with bounded live evidence.
Response: The owner accepted retaining the design and clarified that GLAZE is already deployed, requesting verification of the existing deployment rather than a new contract restriction.
Remaining work / limits: Retain consolidation/finding-036-deployment/README.md, result.json and verify.py as the verification record. Preserve supply checks and trusted-peer controls for future chain additions or migrations. No transaction was sent and the source freeze remains active.
CFG-01 — Bind the immutable auction to the intended payment token
Severity: High-impact deployment risk in prose; import Medium.
Original observation status: Deployment configuration gap; official manifest verification required.
Disposition: Accepted deployment configuration risk with existing post-deployment verification; no contract change.
Response: The owner confirmed that deployment verification scripts are used after deployment to check the resulting configuration and chose to rely on that release process.
Remaining work / limits: Keep post-deployment verification as a release requirement and retain results for the exact deployed configuration. No verifier execution, deployment, source implementation or source-freeze closure is claimed in this decision.
AUC-H01 — Empty-period decay allows later funding to clear for zero payment
Severity: Unscored prose; import Medium.
Original observation status: Later reconciliation resolves documented explicit owner acceptance.
Project review: R002-FINAL-027 — An idle buyback auction can distribute revenue without retiring GLAZE.
Disposition: Accepted buyback idle decay and zero-retirement sales; no contract change.
Response: The owner accepted that the GLAZE buyback auction can distribute USDG while retiring zero GLAZE after its price fully decays. This reconfirms the previously documented economic policy and applies the same retained decay direction as finding 026 to the buyback contract.
Remaining work / limits: Keep public buyback explanations accurate about zero-retirement sales and distinguish revenue funding from actual GLAZE retirement. Preserve original ratings, historical acceptance and evidence limits. No contract change, new test execution, deployment verification or source-freeze closure is claimed.
OFT-H01 — Ownership and endpoint-delegate handoff may not remain synchronized
Severity: Unscored.
Original observation status: Known administrative risk; harmful endpoint action/deployed state unverified.
Project review: R002-FINAL-033 — OFT ownership and endpoint delegate authority can diverge.
Disposition: Accepted LayerZero owner/delegate separation by design; no contract change.
Response: The owner chose to keep the upstream role separation by design. LayerZero documents delegate configuration separately from ownership transfer; the project accepts the operational consequences rather than adding automatic synchronization.
Remaining work / limits: Document intentional owner/delegate configurations and review both roles during operational handoffs. Official reference checked October 4: https://docs.layerzero.network/v2/get-started/create-lz-oapp/configuring-pathways (separate delegate and owner configuration). No contract or UI implementation, new executable validation, live-state verification or source-freeze closure is claimed.
TOKEN-H01 — Nominal accounting depends on exact token movement
Severity: Unscored.
Original observation status: Supported-token deployment hypothesis; standard-token assumptions documented.
Disposition: Accepted supported-token assumptions; production compatibility and issuer-control verification pending.
Response: The owner accepts the token assumptions and related issuer risks already reviewed, while retaining verification of the actual intended production assets rather than relying on token names or symbols.
Remaining work / limits: Verify and document production token identity, compatibility and issuer powers for intended supported assets during release/integration review. No new contract machinery is selected and no live-asset check, source change, runtime execution, deployment or completed fix is claimed here.
REV-H02 — Splitter ownership can be irreversibly renounced
Severity: Unscored.
Original observation status: Owner-action footgun; finalization policy unresolved.
Response: The owner states that splitter ownership will not be renounced and considers replacement deployment an additional operational option. Retained ownership preserves recipient-rotation authority; replacement deployment alone is not recovery of existing funds.
Remaining work / limits: Keep ownership retention and replacement-migration limits explicit in operations guidance. If replacement is needed, verify deployment bindings, upstream redirection permissions and treatment of old balances/claims. No additional contract remediation or completed recovery is claimed.
REV-I01 — One raw unit can cross a team-recipient handoff
Severity: Informational.
Original observation status: Documented informational rounding; cumulative equal split retained.
Project review: R002-FINAL-073 — An odd raw revenue unit can cross a recipient rotation.
Disposition: Accepted odd-unit carry across recipient rotation; no additional contract change.
Response: The owner accepts bounded rounding under the equal split and reconfirms that unpaid balances use the current recipient rather than creating rights for former wallets.
Remaining work / limits: Retain the rounding policy during the previously approved splitter remediation and document it accurately. No additional change is selected for this finding and no source modification, new execution, deployment or completed fix is claimed.
DB-01 — Momentary signal can unlock routing, then zero-weight time strands Resonance revenue
Project review: R002-FINAL-010 — Resonance routing only checks signal weight at the start.
Disposition: Accepted Resonance zero-signal behavior; no contract change.
Response: The owner chose to leave the current implementation unchanged, citing prior Veridise review and a preference to avoid further changes. Retain the existing start guard and accept the later-zero stream behavior. This disposition does not expand the historical auditor's verified scope or imply that an accepted limitation is fixed.
Remaining work / limits: Keep the difference between buffered new revenue and elapsed unallocated revenue clear in documentation. Preserve the existing guard, accrued entitlements and stream accounting during unrelated later work. Original evidence, severity disagreements and historical audit scope remain preserved. No code change, new execution, deployment verification or freeze closure is claimed.
DB-02 — BribeRouter can begin a reward stream with zero signal
Severity: Priority Medium.
Original observation status: Exact prior overlap; retirement acceptance does not cover every public zero-weight route.
Project review: R002-FINAL-008 — Direct Bribe routing can start a stream with no signal weight.
Disposition: Accepted zero-weight Bribe funding risk; no contract change.
Response: The owner conditionally accepted this finding if Curve MultiRewards retains the same zero-stake behavior, preferring minimal deviation from the upstream accounting. A read-only comparison confirms that condition. This is project risk acceptance, not a fix or an upstream security endorsement.
Remaining work / limits: Keep the loss of elapsed unallocated rewards and permissionless-admission difference explicit in reward documentation. Preserve the upstream comparison, original audit observations and evidence limits. No contract changes, tests, deployed-behavior verification, broader safety conclusion, or freeze closure are claimed.
DB-03 — Public FullRange updates can erase fractional V4 fee entitlement
Severity: Priority Low.
Original observation status: Accepted but present; bounded less than one raw unit per currency per update.
Project review: R002-FINAL-024 — Shared V4 position updates can discard fractional raw fees.
Disposition: Accepted native V4 fractional-fee rounding; no additional contract change.
Response: After confirming that the fee conversion and checkpoint advance occur in Uniswap V4 core, the owner accepted this inherited precision limitation. FullRange controls when it updates a position and retains its existing partial collection guard. This reconfirms prior acceptance without treating upstream behavior as a formal upstream risk endorsement.
Remaining work / limits: Retain rounding disclosures and preserve the existing partial guard when implementing findings 001 and 022. Verify per-wrapper position identity for the adapted guard in that later implementation phase. Preserve original severity and evidence records; acceptance is not a fix or proof of negligible impact for every asset. No additional contract change, new test execution, deployment verification or source-freeze closure is claimed.
DB-04 — Full-balance routing can wedge at the lifetime admission cap
Severity: Priority Low / operational hardening.
Original observation status: GZ-012 accepted under intended-asset assumptions; cap exhaustibility with actual assets not shown.
Disposition: Accepted lifetime funding caps and full-balance routing; no contract change.
Response: The owner reconfirmed historical GZ-012 acceptance after reviewing the permanent cumulative limit, the full-balance routing consequence and the very large headroom for ordinary intended assets.
Remaining work / limits: Keep lifetime-cap and full-balance routing limitations in asset and operations documentation; monitor remaining capacity where relevant. No contract change, new executable validation, live-chain action or source-freeze closure is claimed.
DH-01 — External component identity is security-critical but only code presence is enforced
Severity: Conditional impact Critical in prose; import Informational.
Original observation status: Blocked deployment hypothesis, NOT active Critical. Frozen FullRangeDeployment and VerifyLaunchpad already verify canonical runtime/graph.
Disposition: Accepted deployment configuration risk with existing post-deployment verification; no contract change.
Response: The owner confirmed that deployment verification scripts are used after deployment to check the resulting configuration and chose to rely on that release process.
Remaining work / limits: Keep post-deployment verification as a release requirement and retain results for the exact deployed configuration. No verifier execution, deployment, source implementation or source-freeze closure is claimed in this decision.
DH-02 — Standard-token assumptions are explicit but incompletely enforced
Severity: Conditional impact High in prose; import Informational.
Original observation status: Known supported-asset trust boundary, NOT active High. Preserve separately executed ToB Auction/Bribe branches; broad other branches source-only.
Disposition: Accepted supported-token assumptions; production compatibility and issuer-control verification pending.
Response: The owner accepts the token assumptions and related issuer risks already reviewed, while retaining verification of the actual intended production assets rather than relying on token names or symbols.
Remaining work / limits: Verify and document production token identity, compatibility and issuer powers for intended supported assets during release/integration review. No new contract machinery is selected and no live-asset check, source change, runtime execution, deployment or completed fix is claimed here.
Disposition: Accepted Auction payment-token compatibility risk; no contract change.
Response: The owner accepted the exact-transfer payment-token assumption and the resulting underpayment risk if an incompatible token is selected, retaining the simple settlement implementation without special transfer-tax handling.
Remaining work / limits: Keep standard exact-transfer payment-token requirements and the lack of on-chain enforcement explicit in Strategy asset-selection and compatibility documentation. No contract change, new test execution, live-asset validation, deployment verification or source-freeze closure is claimed.
Disposition: Accepted Bribe reward-token funding shortfall risk; no contract change.
Response: The owner accepted the exact-transfer reward-token assumption and the possibility that an incompatible admitted token leaves rewards underfunded and later claims unable to complete. Retain the current simple funding implementation.
Remaining work / limits: Keep exact-transfer reward-token requirements and possible underfunded claims explicit in reward admission and compatibility documentation. Preserve original conditional evidence and ratings; accepted risk is not a verified fix. No contract change, new test execution, live-asset validation, deployment verification or source-freeze closure is claimed.
<!-- current-followups -->
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 6 follow-up — Report outcome / coverage record
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 6 follow-up. Reviewed source:91206a4ed18c514cdad3f8e8b09e0ca08ffd3ffb. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; returned effort unavailable.
Disposition: ASSURANCE_OPEN.
Response: ASSURANCE: ASSURANCE_OPEN — Preserve original run outcome, refusals, skipped/inconclusive checks, bounded validation and dependency uncertainty. A completed annotation is not completion of the audit campaign.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 6 follow-up — Status boundary
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 6 follow-up. Reviewed source:91206a4ed18c514cdad3f8e8b09e0ca08ffd3ffb. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; returned effort unavailable.
Disposition: ASSURANCE_OPEN.
Response: ASSURANCE: ASSURANCE_OPEN — Preserve original run outcome, refusals, skipped/inconclusive checks, bounded validation and dependency uncertainty. A completed annotation is not completion of the audit campaign.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-COLD-CORE-01 — Reward streams can be griefed into zero-weight periods
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G01: Includes transient start weight followed by empty intervals; no catch-up allocation. Release checks retained: L03. G02: Initially empty, later empty and retired-Strategy cases each have explicit acceptances.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-COLD-CORE-02 — A raw-unit routing floor can strand low-decimal Bribe assets
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-COLD-CORE-03 — OFT ownership and endpoint-delegate authority can diverge
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G07: Exact prior acceptance includes retained delegate authority after ownership renunciation. Matching owner/delegate is not a contract invariant. Release checks retained: L02.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-COLD-CORE-04 — Late-arriving auction inventory can clear for zero consideration
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: informational.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G04: Exact historical core-Auction acceptance; no need to extend a token-only acceptance.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-COLD-TOKEN-01 — Idle buyback epochs can sell newly split USDG for zero GLAZE
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G03: Zero-price/zero-retirement sales and caller-influenced funding cadence are expressly intended.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-COLD-TOKEN-02 — Anyone can start a Bribe stream with zero signal and strand its rewards
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G02: Initially empty, later empty and retired-Strategy cases each have explicit acceptances.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-COLD-TOKEN-03 — Genesis supply uniqueness is not enforced across the OFT mesh
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G08: Accept constructor-controlled genesis and peer trust design. Historical live evidence does not verify the new release. Release checks retained: L02.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-COLD-TOKEN-04 — OFT ownership handoff does not hand off LayerZero delegate authority
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G07: Exact prior acceptance includes retained delegate authority after ownership renunciation. Matching owner/delegate is not a contract invariant. Release checks retained: L02.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-COLD-TOKEN-05 — The core Auction can advance an epoch without transferring its revenue out
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: low.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G17: Exact acceptance expressly says not to add a self-recipient guard. Withdraw the previously proposed unapplied guard.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-COLD-TOKEN-06 — Permissionless tiny liquidity changes can repeatedly discard fractional V4 fees
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: low.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G10: Includes externally induced repeated updates and cumulative loss; retains supported-asset assessment. Release checks retained: L03.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-COLD-TOKEN-07 — Permissionless claims can make invalid fee-recipient settings irreversible
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: low.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G18: Accept irreversible completed payouts to an unusable configured destination; actual destination compatibility still needs checking. Release checks retained: L01.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-TEST-EXPOSED-CORE-01 — Supplementary test-exposed: an unsolicited high-scale token transfer can permanently poison a Bribe route
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCURRENTREVIEW.
Response: G14: Lifetime caps and full-balance routing are accepted only under intended-asset assumptions. The specific freely mintable/high-decimal admitted-token consequence falls outside that limit. Release checks retained: L03.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-TEST-EXPOSED-CORE-02 — Supplementary test-exposed: restarting an active stream can strand previously scheduled units in future-only carry
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCURRENTREVIEW.
Response: G15-B: Accept indefinitely pending rate-division remainder, qualifying active restarts and allocation under later participation; preserve existing earned claims. G15-R: H014 expressly limits its future-participant acceptance to Bribe. H017 accepts restart timing. Keep the separately reported Resonance beneficiary/terminal-carry consequence for review.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-TEST-EXPOSED-CORE-03 — Supplementary test-exposed: permissionless zero-payout checkpoints can repeatedly discard fractional strategy revenue
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: low.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G09: Exact acceptance includes permissionless zero-payout Strategy checkpoints and cumulative fractional loss.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-TEST-EXPOSED-CORE-04 — Supplementary test-exposed: direct Fund redemption is diluted until Fund-held Coin is burned
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G16: Owner retained direct balance-only Fund semantics and selected canonical LP collect/claim/burn/redeem in Periphery. Release checks retained: L01.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-TEST-EXPOSED-CORE-05 — Supplementary test-exposed: a cheap collectible leg can erase fractional fees in the valuable FullRange leg
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G10: Includes externally induced repeated updates and cumulative loss; retains supported-asset assessment. Release checks retained: L03.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-TEST-EXPOSED-CORE-06 — Supplementary test-exposed: fees at the V4 signed-delta limit can freeze FullRange collection and principal withdrawal
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: low.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G19: Accept the native signed limit and possible blocked collect/exit at extreme fees, without asserting unreachability. Release checks retained: L03.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-TEST-EXPOSED-CORE-07 — Supplementary test-exposed: the accepted maximum launch configuration exceeds the recorded chain transaction gas cap
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: low.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G20: Accept excessive maximum configurations. Does not cover a new claim that every configuration exceeds a target cap. Release checks retained: L04.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-TEST-EXPOSED-TOKEN-01 — Supplementary/test-exposed: an expired auction can release newly split USDG for zero GLAZE
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: high.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G03: Zero-price/zero-retirement sales and caller-influenced funding cadence are expressly intended.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-TEST-EXPOSED-TOKEN-02 — Supplementary/test-exposed: OFT ownership changes leave the endpoint delegate unchanged
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G07: Exact prior acceptance includes retained delegate authority after ownership renunciation. Matching owner/delegate is not a contract invariant. Release checks retained: L02.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-TEST-EXPOSED-TOKEN-03 — Supplementary/test-exposed: the splitter binds USDG but not the canonical GLAZE payment token
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G06: Accept the design relying on separate verification; actual GLAZE/USDG/dependency bindings remain a release check. Release checks retained: L01.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-TEST-EXPOSED-TOKEN-04 — Supplementary/test-exposed: single-genesis OFT supply is an unenforced deployment invariant
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: medium.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G08: Accept constructor-controlled genesis and peer trust design. Historical live evidence does not verify the new release. Release checks retained: L02.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up — R004-H-GEBAL-DB-TEST-EXPOSED-TOKEN-05 — Supplementary/test-exposed: splitter ownership renunciation permanently freezes the team recipient
Review: Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up. Reviewed source:ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Model: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Settings: ultra requested; independent echo unavailable.
Severity: low.
Disposition: ACCEPTEDCARRYFORWARD.
Response: G21: Retain mechanics and the operational choice to keep ownership; verify actual roles. Release checks retained: L01.
Review summary and follow-ups
Status: Completed bounded source review.
Result
Twenty-one overlapping raw observations across four source passes, with project dispositions recorded below; no new confirmed high or critical finding.
Scope and limits
39/39 primary files reviewed; 113 dependency files included as context. Two sandboxed builds passed. Two Slither tasks hit the output cap. Actual model and effort were locally recorded; no independent server-side echo. Prior audit-context exposure prevents blind independent-discovery credit.
Original run evidence is preserved separately. The findings and project responses on this page record the subsequent owner review and remediation status. This summary does not certify deployment safety or count historical Veridise and V12 work as coverage of this freeze.
<!-- current-followups -->
Current project response
Project responses updated October 9, 2026. Latest inventory: 133 observations including duplicates; 125 accepted, two locally remediated Periphery observations, six deferred in whole or part, zero undecided contract portions. The Periphery fix passed 43 contract and 21 SDK tests; the owner waived its additional independent re-audit, which was not run. Acceptance is not remediation; deferred work stays open.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 6 follow-up
Reviewed source: 91206a4ed18c514cdad3f8e8b09e0ca08ffd3ffb. Status captured 2026-10-06.
Runner model selection: gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Historical returned-model field: not independently returned. Separate server-attested identity: not independently returned. Requested reasoning setting ultra. Returned effort: not independently echoed.
Harness revision: 9ad24645f92a3821ae4539db5f1be52b48ed379e. FullRange-focused scope and supporting integrations; this is not a new 39-contract review.
Later source changes include manager permissions, forced exit for revoked managers, buyback basket selection, richer events, launch caps, component getters, and fee-preparing Periphery redemption. October 8 follow-ups reviewed the resulting October 7 candidate. The later October 9 fee opt-out received local validation and owner acceptance with the additional re-audit waived.
Original executable evidence and provider transcripts remain private. This is a source-specific public summary, not a downloadable original, complete-coverage certificate or professional audit by the harness author.
Gebal × Daybreak Blue · October 8 follow-up
Reviewed source: ff973d5ca9e137f5561de88b22d8a53f221f9e19. Status captured 2026-10-09.
2026-10-08-blocked-073318: BLOCKEDPREDISPATCH. Historical pending-choice blocker, superseded by owner staged-pair decision.
2026-10-08-full-method-prep-01: COMPLETESTAGEDPAIRANDADDENDAWITHLIMITATIONS. Both independent 39-path cold Daybreak/ultra first passes sealed and origin-bound imports complete; core and token native full-test profiles completed; both disclosed test-exposed addenda separately sealed (core 7 observations/10 gaps, token 5/9), unadjudicated and not imported. Native cold compiler intake was unsupported and provider-returned identity fields unavailable.
Identity/settings: Daybreak Blue and ultra selected/requested locally; server-side model/effort identity was not independently returned.
Owner review: All registered observations from this source have a decision. The two helper-redemption findings were remediated later in Periphery at 517e09a33ba1c5d506566b32398f254c5121d231; 43 contract and 21 SDK tests passed. The owner accepted that fix and waived its additional independent re-audit, which was not run.
Original executable evidence and provider transcripts remain private. This is a source-specific public summary, not a downloadable original, complete-coverage certificate or professional audit by the harness author.
